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BOOTH V. MARYLAND
112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit
FACTS
John Marvin Booth and four other petitioners brought an action for
a declaratory judgment and injunction against the State of Maryland
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners asserted that under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,1 ("AEDPA"),
Maryland was not entitled to the benefits of the "opt-in" classification
under chapter 154.2 Petitioners further sought to have the court enjoin
Maryland from invoking chapter 154 as a defense to the prisoners'
prospective habeas corpus cases.
3
Disallowing Maryland's Eleventh Amendment4 immunity defense,
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland found for the
petitioners and granted both the requested declaratory judgment and
injunction. The court reasoned that Maryland was not entitled to the
benefits of chapter 154 because the state had not met all of the require-
ments of the section. 5 Maryland appealed the judgment to the United
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, asserting that the prisoners' suit
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
6
HOLDING
The court of appeals reversed and held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the prisoners' suits,7 and that the suits did not
penetrate that immunity by falling under one of the two exceptions.
8
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1996). For a thorough analysis of the
act's effect on habeas corpus proceedings, see Raymond,"The Incredible
Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus Under the Anti- terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996," Cap. Def. J., Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52 and Eade,
"The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Part II: Habeas Corpus Under the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," Cap. Def. J., Vol. 9,
No. 2, p. 55.
2 Under chapter 154 of AEDPA a state is entitled to certain benefits
if it complies with the requirements of the act. To comply, a state must,
among other things, establish "a mechanism for the appointment, compen-
sation, and payment ofreasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel
in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent persons whose
capital convictions and sentences ... have ... become final.. .." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2261(b) (1996). Ifa state voluntarily complies with the requirements, it
is termed an opt-in state. If a state is an opt-in state, then prisoners from the
state who seek federal habeas corpus relief must follow chapter 154's
requirements, including filing "in the appropriate district court not later
than 180 days [(as opposed to one year),] after final State court affirmance
of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (a) (1996).
3 Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 140 (4th Cir. 1997).
4 "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that a state's immunity against suits brought
by its own citizens (sovereign immunity), is implied in the Eleventh
Amendment. Booth, 112 F.3d at 141.
5 Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996).
6 Booth, 112 F.3d at 141.
7 Id. at 142.
8 Id. at 144-45.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Application of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
On appeal, the court of appeals avoided addressing the substance of
petitioners' (hereafter referred to as "Booth") claims by finding at the
outset that the suit was barred under the Eleventh Amendment. The court
first looked to the history of state immunity to suit. According to the
court, the Constitution was adopted by the states despite fears that the
states would be subjected to Federal court summons. Those fears later
led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment after the case of
Chisholm v. Georgia,9 in which the Court held that a state was in fact
susceptible to a suit by a citizen of the United States. The Booth court
applied this understanding of the Eleventh Amendment to Booth's suit
and declared the suit barred unless Booth could demonstrate that the suit
fell under one of the two exceptions to the amendment. 10
A. The Ex Parte Young Exception
Booth first asserted that his suit fell under the exception to the
Eleventh Amendment established in the case of ExParte Young,1 which
held that the amendment does not "bar suits seeking to enjoin state
officials from committing continuing violations of federal law."
'12 Ini-
tially, the court of appeals characterized the exception as quite limited
and strictly enforced. The court then turned to the actions of the state,
both actual andpotential, and foundno violation offederallaw. Maryland's
announcement of its intention to invoke chapter 154 in Booth's upcom-
ing habeas corpus proceeding was found not to violate federal law. Even
the actual raising of chapter 154 by the state would not be unlawful,
according to the court of appeals. The court stated that "[w]hether [or
not] Maryland successfully invokes the defense, the state cannot have
violated federal law merely by raising it."
'13
The court then prescribed the appropriate avenue for Booth to raise
his concerns about the applicability of chapter 154: the habeas corpus
proceeding itself. The court cited to Hamblin v. Anderson14 as an
example of the correct way to raise such concerns. In arguing against this
procedure, Booth suggested that the mere possibility of a successful
chapter 154 defense by the state forces petitioners to file the writ within
180 days and thereby violates their rights.15 The court disagreed:
A party bringing suit must always take the possibility of a
successful affirmative defense into account in its litigation
strategy. In many different actions, litigants must file a case
and plot strategy without clear foreknowledge of how the case
will unfold. To file earlier rather than later is a decision many
a prudent litigant will make.
16
9 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
10 Booth, 112 F.3d at 142.
11 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
12 Booth, 112 F.3d at 142 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-
13 Id. at 143.
14 947 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
15 Booth, 112 F.3d at 143.
16 Id.
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The court's rationale assumes that the state's status as an opt-in
state, and its invocation of the procedures of chapter 154, is appropriately
characterized solely as an affirmative defense to the writ of habeas
corpus, raised by the state at the proceeding itself. The court's own
language betrays that assertion: Booth "need only raise [his] contention
during federal habeas corpus proceedings. In order to ascertain what
procedures will govern federal review of a capital case, a federal court
may be required to determine whether the state has satisfied the require-
ments of chapter 154."17 Thus, the question of whether the petitioner has
180 days or one year to file is not merely a matter of an affirmative
defense, it is a mater of basic procedure for filing the writ.
In its analysis of Booth's case, the court of appeals framed the issue
such that it was easily answered and not seriously disputed. If the
question is whether the petitioner's complaint against the state of
Maryland violated the Eleventh Amendment, the answer is yes. By
reciting the Eleventh Amendment, ticking through the exceptions, and
reciting the requirements for state waiver, the court of appeals was able
to reach a clear cut answer. But the practical implications of the court's
decision are grave. While the court declined to find that Maryland was
violating federal law by its intention to invoke chapter 154, the states's
actions in fact present serious due process concerns.
The United States Supreme Courthas held that "[t]he essence of due
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss (he
given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."' 18 "All
that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision
to be made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard,' to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present
their case." 19 As aresult of the court's ruling, habeas petitioners will not
know the applicable filing deadline for their petitions until after the state
has answered. If a prisoner condemned to die does not know as basic a
matter as the time limitation for filing awrit of habeas corpus, he does not
have "a meaningful opportunity to present [his] case." 20
B. The Habeas Corpus Exception
Booth also asserted that Maryland was not immune to his suit
because it was habeas corpus related, and thus constituted the habeas
corpus exception to the Eleventh Amendment. The court of appeals
agreed that habeas corpus suits are not subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, essentially because they allege continuing violations of fed-
eral law, thus falling under the Ex Parte Young exception. The court
found, however, that Booth's complaint was not a habeas corpus suit and
consequently did not fall under the second exception. 21
C. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Booth also asserted thatMaryland waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by declaring its intention to invoke chapter 154 at the habeas
corpus proceeding. The court of appeals addressed this question by
17 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
18 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,171-72 (1951)). See also
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part that the constitutional guarantee of
due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard).
19 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 348-49 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254,268-69 (1970)).
20 Id. at 349.
21Booth, 112 F.3d at 145.
reference toAtascadero StateHospital v. Scanlon,22 which described the
two ways in which a state may waive its immunity. A state may waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity explicitly in a statute or constitu-
tional provision or by "voluntarily participating in federal programs
when Congress expresses 'a clear intent to condition participation in the
programs ... on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immu-
nity.' 23 With respect to the second method for waiver, the court
observed that not only did AEDPA not require states to waive their
constitutional immunity, the act "is replete with provisions which evi-
dence an intentto increase federal judicial deference toward the states.'
24
The court concluded that Maryland had not waived its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity under the Atascadero standards.
25
II. The Efficiency Argument
Lastly, Booth asserted that concerns of judicial efficiency and
economy would be served by substantive consideration of the chapter
154. In his brief to the court, Booth asserted that:
because "five judges of the lower court would each have the
power and jurisdiction during the five inmates' individual
habeas proceedings to consider whetherMaryland satisfies the
requirements of Chapter 154, then as a matter of judicial
economy and power this question can surely be addressed by
a single judge in a single proceeding."
26
The court quickly denounced Booth's argument against application
of the Eleventh Amendment immunity, saying that the Constitution is
"not simply a document of judicial economy and convenience... [and
that] it imbues the states with attributes of sovereignty." 27 The court
further stated that "policy, no mater how compelling, is insufficient,
standing alone, to waive [sovereign] immunity."28
II. Avoiding the AEDPA Trap
The court's position is clear: the proper time to inquire about the
time limits for filing a writ of habeas corpus is after the writ is filed. The
court cited with approval several cases in which chapter 154 was raised
as an affirmative defense to the petitions. 29 As interpreted by the court
of appeals, chapter 154presents petitionerwith aHobson's choice: either
file in 180 days, cutting in halfthepreparation time, or take up to one year
to file, and risk that the court will find that the state is an opt-in state. For
attorneys who are unaware of the time limits in AEDPA, this may be a
22 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding that the test for determining
whether a State has waived its immunity from federal court jurisdiction
is a stringent one).
23 Booth, 112 F.3d at 145 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247).
24 Idat 145. As supportforits observation, the courtof appeals cited
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (no relief for claims decided in state court unless
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law); 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1) (factual determination of state court presumed correct unless
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence); and 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (in
capital cases in complying states, federal court can consider only claims
that were raised and decided on merits in state court).
25 Id. at 145.
26Id. at 145 (quoting Appellees' Brief at 15).
27 Booth, 112 F.3d at 146.
28 Id. at 146 (quoting Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,
321 (1986)).
29 Id. at 144. See, e.g.,Bennettv.Angelone, 92F.3d 1336 (4th Cir.
1996);Matav.Johnson,99F.3d 1261 (5thCir. 1996);Breadv.Netherland,
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deadly trap for their clients. As unpalatable and unjust as it is, under the
current fourth circuit interpretation, caution dictates that defense attor-
neys file a writ of habeas corpus within the 180 day time period.
Summary and Analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996); Wrightv.Angelone, 944 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Va. 1996); Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va.
1996); & Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
MU'MIN v. PRUETT
1997 WL 597978 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Dawud Majid Mu'Min was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death for killing a store owner. The murder occurred while
Mu'Min was out on work detail from a state correctional facility, where
he was serving 48 years imprisonment for first-degree murder. 1 Prior to
trial, Mu'Min's counsel moved for a change of venue, based upon
potentially harmful pretrial publicity.2 The trialjudge deferred action on
the change of venue motion, and after finding that an impartial jury had
been impaneled, the judge denied the motion.3 The judge also denied
Mu'Min's motion in limine to exclude an order memorializing his
previous first-degree murder conviction.4 During the sentencing phase,
the jury sent a note to the judge inquiring as to the meaning of "life
imprisonment." 5 The judge declined to answer the question and advised
the jury not to concern itself with the issue.6 Mu'Min's counsel did not
object to the court's refusal to answer the jury's question.7 Upon finding
both the future dangerousness and vileness predicates, 8 the jury imposed
a sentence of death.9
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Mu'Min did not
challenge either the judge's denial of his motion for change of venue or
thejudge's failure to answer thejury's written question, but did challenge
the judge's denial of his motion in limine, arguing that the prejudicial
impact of the order outweighed its probative value.10 The supreme court
denied relief and upheld the conviction and sentence. 11 The United
IMu'Min v. Pruett, 1997 WL597978 (4thCir. Aug. 18,1997) at *1.
2 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *1.
3Id.
4 Id. Most likely, the prosecutors sought to admit this order to
establish Mu'Min's status as an escapee at the time of the commission of
the crime.
5 Id. at *2.
6 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
7 Id.
8 See Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
9 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
10ld.
111d. See Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433,389 S.E.2d 886
(1990).
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider an unrelated issue
and ultimately concluded that the trial court had not erred.
12
Mu'Min next sought relief on state habeas, asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel and several other claims. 13 The state habeas court
found Mu'Min's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be without
merit and found that the remainder of his claims had either been
previously determined, and thus could not be heard in a state habeas
hearing, or were procedurally defaulted. 14 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of Virginia denied review, and the United States Supreme Court
denied Mu'Min's petition for a writ of certiorari.15
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in United States District
Court, Mu'Min challenged, as violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights to a fair trial and due process, the trial court's denial
of his motion for a change of venue, admission of the order that
memorialized his first-degree murder conviction, and refusal to respond
to the jury's question. 16 The magistrate recommended that the district
court dismiss Mu'Min's petition based on the state supreme court's
reliance on the Slayton v. Parrigan17 procedural default rule, which, in
essence, dictates that issues not properly raised at trial or on direct appeal
are procedurally defaulted and may not be considered in habeas. 18 The
magistrate also found that because Mu'Min had not excused his defaults,
his claims did not merit habeas review. The district court followed the
magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Mu'Min's petition.
12 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500
U.S.415, 111 S.Ct. 1899,114 L.Ed.2d493 (1991), rehearing denied, 501
U.S. 1269, 112 S.Ct. 13, 115 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2. See Mu'Min v. Murray, 511
U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 1416, 128 L.Ed.2d 87 (1994).
16Id. Mu'Min based his claim that the court had erred in refusing
to respond to the jury's question upon Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that when future dangerousness is at issue, the
defense counsel should be permitted to introduce evidence pertaining to
a defendant's parole eligibility or ineligibility).
17 215 Va. 27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974) (issues not
properly raised at trial or on direct appeal are thus procedurally defaulted
and may not be considered in habeas).
18 Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
